Afghanistan: A Winning Strategy

David Cortright of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies proposes a more powerful strategy for Afghanistan than sending more troops, as part of an overall set of recommendations for the new administration, posted at AlterNet, (18 December 2008): "In This Era of Hope, Obama Must Emprace a Genuine Agenda of Peace":

The deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan is unlikely to bring lasting security to the region or stem the flow of recruits and support to  al-Qaida. The presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is the problem, not the solution. Political opposition to foreign military operations has grown in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the deployment of additional troops will only make matters worse, fueling further resistance and terrorist attacks.

War and military occupation are not an effective strategy against al-Qaida. The concept of a "war on terror" is misguided and counterproductive. Utilizing the rhetoric and policy of war turns the criminals who commit mass murder into warriors and presumed heroes within their communities....

When the United States bombs and invades Muslim communities, this undermines our moral standing and validates Osama bin Laden’s warped image of America waging war on Islam. Polls in Muslim countries have shown as much as 80 percent of the population agreeing with the view that American policy is directed against Islam. As long as these attitudes prevail, there will be no end of would-be recruits willing to blow themselves up to kill Americans and our allies.

The 9/11 Commission argued that the campaign against terrorism is primarily a political struggle for hearts and minds. The goal is "prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamic terrorism," which means separating al-Qaida from its social support base. This requires policies that rely not on military force but on political and economic measures that reduce support for violent extremism. The solution in Afghanistan is not more troops but a greater commitment to diplomacy and development. Security experts and senior military officers have called for power-sharing negotiations with local Taliban elements as a way of peeling away support from al-Qaida's globalist agenda. This approach should be combined with major investments in economic development and support for human rights. These are strategies that will be more effective, and less costly, over the long term in reducing the global terrorist danger.

Cortright's recent book, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge University Press, 2008), is described by Desmond Tutu as, "A comprehensive look at the history of peace, examining the impact of social movements and the evolution of peacemaking knowledge and practice. An exploration of the essential principles and practical means of preventing war and resolving conflict without violence."

Comments

[Berny Jacques]

Cortright's position seems to be very naive in regards to the security side of the coin. I agree with him on increasing development and diplomacy; but these novle efforts must be coupled with security forces who will serve as a safeguard against those who seek to disrupt the devolopment and diplomacy efforts. I want to agree with Cortright, but he seems to ignore the fact that there are extremists who will still wage violence despite of the purpose of our presence there. Social development cannot take place without a secure environment; security forces provide secure environments.

[Berny Jacques]

I prefer the Zakaria model http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/fareed_zakaria/2009/02/four_keys_to_success_in_afghan.html

[Jeff B]

Cortright is quite familiar with extremists. Don't confuse his "pragmatic pacifism" with "absolute pacifism," regardless of their strengths and weaknesses (both biblical and strategic). He deals with the issue of terrorism in Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for an Age of Terrorism (maybe you've already read this; I don't know).

You may still disagree with him even when you more fully understand where he's coming from, but accusations of "naivity" add little depth to the conversation.

He hosted a most engaging symposium this past week at Notre Dame that commemorated 60 years of the Geneva Conventions. I wish I could have attended more sessions. Multiple viewpoints were well represented. One presenter (Martin Van Creveld) went as far as to call international law (treaties, ICJ, ICC, etc.) a house of cards that will/should scatter like the cards in Alice in Wonderland (he also expressed sympathy for S Milosevic).

Cortright has studied these issues more in-depth than most of us here, so agree or disagree, I think we should focus on the issues not on labeling.

Interesting article by Zakaria. I think it could be argued that Zakaria's goal (as stated by Gates) is looking for short-term success, whereas Cortright is looking at a long-term solution (though they do clearly have different perspectives on the power of non-military activities, something that could also be said of readers of this blog).